거버넌스 제안 상세
제안서 상세 내용과 투표 현황을 확인하세요.
한글 버전
- ■ 주석 *헌법 위원회: 에이다 거버넌스 의사결정을 담당하는 기구
- 이를 5명으로 낮추어 운영상의 완충 지대를 확보하고 거버넌스 중단 리스크를 방지하고자 함 .
- 본 제안은 van Rossem 하드포크를 대비한 Plutus 비용 모델 변경과 연계되어 있음 .
- ■ 주석 *Plutus: 에이다의 스마트 컨트랙트 플랫폼 **하드포크: 블록체인 프로토콜의 대규모 업데이트
- 이는 위원회 규모 축소를 의도하는 것이 아니라, 위원 결원 시에도 거버넌스가 정상 작동하도록 하기 위한 조치임 .
- 위원 수가 5명일 경우 거버넌스 안건 거부권 행사가 상대적으로 쉬워질 수 있으나, 현재의 7명 체제를 유지하려는 노력은 지속될 것임 .
- 과거 기술적 충돌로 무효화되었던 안건을 재제출하는 것이며, 보안 및 성능상의 위험은 없음 .
- ■ 주석 *DRep: 위임된 투표자(Delegated Representative) **거버넌스: 블록체인 네트워크의 의사결정 체계
English
The ratification of this Governance Action depends on the enactment of another live Parameter Change Governance Action (`gov_action1eqhnsdyf3exhp5mqt7sdjtl7xy69wqg8tvg854psns2jt72cra3qqrcnr8r`), which will change a number of Plutus cost model settings in preparation for the van Rossem hard fork.
Reducing the parameter setting to 5 would provide an operational buffer, allowing the Constitutional Committee to continue operating with a smaller committee. This reduces the risk of governance inoperability while allowing time to resolve any potential issues and to increase the Committee size if required.
### Dependency
This Parameter Change governance action depends on another live Parameter Change which proposes to update the Plutus Cost Model ahead of the upcoming van Rossem Hard Fork `gov_action1eqhnsdyf3exhp5mqt7sdjtl7xy69wqg8tvg854psns2jt72cra3qqrcnr8r`. Note that this Parameter Change will only be enacted if the Plutus Cost Model is also enacted. The dependency is purely temporal: there is no technical interaction between the parameters that are being changed in the two governance actions.
Note that this governance action does not directly affect the current number of Committee members. Nor does it imply that reducing Constitutional Committee size is desired. Rather, this governance action serves as a measure to improve the operational resilience of on-chain governance by introducing a buffer between the minimally required Constitutional Committee seats and the current number of elected seats, while maintaining constitutional safeguards.
This proposed change aims to reduce the risk of governance halting when the number of committee members drops below `committeeMinSize`. This change has no effect on the maximum number of Constitutional Committee members.
A reduction to the proposed `committeeMinSize` in conjunction with reduced committee membership would change the required amount of Constitutional votes to pass a given Governance Action. Assuming a current voting threshold of 2/3 for the Constitutional Committee, the approval thresholds are deemed sufficient. However, it should be noted that it is easier to reject a governance action with only 5 Constitutional Committee members. At a Constitutional Committee size of 5, the inactivity of one member, would allow another to fully veto governance actions. See the comparison table below.
| Number of Committee Members | Number of Constitutional Votes to meet threshold | Number of Unconstitutional Votes to prevent threshold |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7 | 5 | 3 |
| 6 | 4 | 3 |
| 5 | 4 | 2 |
This governance action is not an attempt to centralize Cardano governance by promoting a reduced Constitutional Committee. Rather, the parameter defines a minimum number of members that must be registered and active on-chain in order for Cardano governance to operate fully. The intention of this governance action is to create a buffer to the minimum number where the governance system can continue to function in the event of one or two members retiring or their terms expiring (assuming a current 7 member body).
It should be noted that the current Constitutional Committee elections process, facilitated by Intersect, is intended to run periodically to maintain a 7 seat Constitutional Committee, and is not intended to lower the existing number of seats.
### Historical Context on Resubmission
A previous governance action to change the `committeeMinSize` parameter (`gov_action1mldvtys6ketjg87wtpvr6cd77kdrd8sp62a8sxgadhmxx2s8lh7sqp2qedq`) was rendered invalid before the end of its lifetime, due to a technical collision with another parameter change governance action at the time (Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2) - `gov_action1cgdsp7g0rr7wgqp7maptpvx525fxuqwfgm5qe3f5r20ew5x2772sq0m5y83`). In order to avoid another collision, Intersect is coordinating this resubmission to allow DReps and Constitutional Committee members to provide feedback on the governance action.
### Guardrail Checklist
This governance action has undergone appropriate technical review and scrutiny through the Parameter Committee Parameter Change Process (PCP), and can be found in the [Cardano Forum “PCP-005” discussion](https://forum.cardano.org/t/pcp-005-committeeminsize-yuta/151156). This change does not endanger the security, functionality, performance, or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain.
The following guardrails are relevant:
***CMS-01**: `committeeMinSize` must not be negative*
***CMS-02**: `committeeMinSize` must not be lower than 3*
***CMS-03**: `committeeMinSize` must not exceed 10*
All three guardrails are satisfied by setting `committeeMinSize` to 5.
*PARAM-06a At least 90 days should normally pass between the publication of an off-chain proposal to change a parameter that is critical to the governance system and the submission of the corresponding on-chain governance action.*
*`committeeMinSize` is considered as a parameter that is critical to the governance. An off-chain proposal was published by Yuta on 2025-11-11.*
### Reversion Plan
This change is reversible, if needed, provided there are at least 7 Constitutional Committee members. Reverting `committeeMinSize` to its current value of 7 would only have an impact if at the time of reversion the Constitutional Committee has fewer than 7 members. The impact would be an immediate halt in governance until sufficient Constitutional Committee members were elected.
The risk of this occurring is minimal, since it is not intended to elect fewer than 7 Constitutional Committee members, even after the reduction of `committeeMinSize` to 5.
부가 정보
| 트랜잭션 해시 | c75bb221606687aa858ec89c7a15c88e9c17054f2e045ae31ecc8a9687cd206e |
|---|---|
| 블록 타임 | 1780679369 |
| Proposal ID | gov_action1cadmygtqv6r64pvwezw859wg36wpwp209cz94cc7ej9fdp7dyphqq58n5ur |
| Proposal Index | 0 |
위원회 최소 크기를 7에서 5로 줄이는 제안
현재 어디까지 왔나
📊 제안서 투표현황
DRep 투표현황
SPO 투표현황
헌법위원회 투표현황
📝 상세 설명
🇰🇷 한글 버전
- ■ 주석 *헌법 위원회: 에이다 거버넌스 의사결정을 담당하는 기구
- 이를 5명으로 낮추어 운영상의 완충 지대를 확보하고 거버넌스 중단 리스크를 방지하고자 함 .
- 본 제안은 van Rossem 하드포크를 대비한 Plutus 비용 모델 변경과 연계되어 있음 .
- ■ 주석 *Plutus: 에이다의 스마트 컨트랙트 플랫폼 **하드포크: 블록체인 프로토콜의 대규모 업데이트
- 이는 위원회 규모 축소를 의도하는 것이 아니라, 위원 결원 시에도 거버넌스가 정상 작동하도록 하기 위한 조치임 .
- 위원 수가 5명일 경우 거버넌스 안건 거부권 행사가 상대적으로 쉬워질 수 있으나, 현재의 7명 체제를 유지하려는 노력은 지속될 것임 .
- 과거 기술적 충돌로 무효화되었던 안건을 재제출하는 것이며, 보안 및 성능상의 위험은 없음 .
- ■ 주석 *DRep: 위임된 투표자(Delegated Representative) **거버넌스: 블록체인 네트워크의 의사결정 체계
🇺🇸 English
The ratification of this Governance Action depends on the enactment of another live Parameter Change Governance Action (`gov_action1eqhnsdyf3exhp5mqt7sdjtl7xy69wqg8tvg854psns2jt72cra3qqrcnr8r`), which will change a number of Plutus cost model settings in preparation for the van Rossem hard fork.
Reducing the parameter setting to 5 would provide an operational buffer, allowing the Constitutional Committee to continue operating with a smaller committee. This reduces the risk of governance inoperability while allowing time to resolve any potential issues and to increase the Committee size if required.
### Dependency
This Parameter Change governance action depends on another live Parameter Change which proposes to update the Plutus Cost Model ahead of the upcoming van Rossem Hard Fork `gov_action1eqhnsdyf3exhp5mqt7sdjtl7xy69wqg8tvg854psns2jt72cra3qqrcnr8r`. Note that this Parameter Change will only be enacted if the Plutus Cost Model is also enacted. The dependency is purely temporal: there is no technical interaction between the parameters that are being changed in the two governance actions.
Note that this governance action does not directly affect the current number of Committee members. Nor does it imply that reducing Constitutional Committee size is desired. Rather, this governance action serves as a measure to improve the operational resilience of on-chain governance by introducing a buffer between the minimally required Constitutional Committee seats and the current number of elected seats, while maintaining constitutional safeguards.
This proposed change aims to reduce the risk of governance halting when the number of committee members drops below `committeeMinSize`. This change has no effect on the maximum number of Constitutional Committee members.
A reduction to the proposed `committeeMinSize` in conjunction with reduced committee membership would change the required amount of Constitutional votes to pass a given Governance Action. Assuming a current voting threshold of 2/3 for the Constitutional Committee, the approval thresholds are deemed sufficient. However, it should be noted that it is easier to reject a governance action with only 5 Constitutional Committee members. At a Constitutional Committee size of 5, the inactivity of one member, would allow another to fully veto governance actions. See the comparison table below.
| Number of Committee Members | Number of Constitutional Votes to meet threshold | Number of Unconstitutional Votes to prevent threshold |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7 | 5 | 3 |
| 6 | 4 | 3 |
| 5 | 4 | 2 |
This governance action is not an attempt to centralize Cardano governance by promoting a reduced Constitutional Committee. Rather, the parameter defines a minimum number of members that must be registered and active on-chain in order for Cardano governance to operate fully. The intention of this governance action is to create a buffer to the minimum number where the governance system can continue to function in the event of one or two members retiring or their terms expiring (assuming a current 7 member body).
It should be noted that the current Constitutional Committee elections process, facilitated by Intersect, is intended to run periodically to maintain a 7 seat Constitutional Committee, and is not intended to lower the existing number of seats.
### Historical Context on Resubmission
A previous governance action to change the `committeeMinSize` parameter (`gov_action1mldvtys6ketjg87wtpvr6cd77kdrd8sp62a8sxgadhmxx2s8lh7sqp2qedq`) was rendered invalid before the end of its lifetime, due to a technical collision with another parameter change governance action at the time (Increase Transaction and Block Memory Units (Part 1 of 2) - `gov_action1cgdsp7g0rr7wgqp7maptpvx525fxuqwfgm5qe3f5r20ew5x2772sq0m5y83`). In order to avoid another collision, Intersect is coordinating this resubmission to allow DReps and Constitutional Committee members to provide feedback on the governance action.
### Guardrail Checklist
This governance action has undergone appropriate technical review and scrutiny through the Parameter Committee Parameter Change Process (PCP), and can be found in the [Cardano Forum “PCP-005” discussion](https://forum.cardano.org/t/pcp-005-committeeminsize-yuta/151156). This change does not endanger the security, functionality, performance, or long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain.
The following guardrails are relevant:
***CMS-01**: `committeeMinSize` must not be negative*
***CMS-02**: `committeeMinSize` must not be lower than 3*
***CMS-03**: `committeeMinSize` must not exceed 10*
All three guardrails are satisfied by setting `committeeMinSize` to 5.
*PARAM-06a At least 90 days should normally pass between the publication of an off-chain proposal to change a parameter that is critical to the governance system and the submission of the corresponding on-chain governance action.*
*`committeeMinSize` is considered as a parameter that is critical to the governance. An off-chain proposal was published by Yuta on 2025-11-11.*
### Reversion Plan
This change is reversible, if needed, provided there are at least 7 Constitutional Committee members. Reverting `committeeMinSize` to its current value of 7 would only have an impact if at the time of reversion the Constitutional Committee has fewer than 7 members. The impact would be an immediate halt in governance until sufficient Constitutional Committee members were elected.
The risk of this occurring is minimal, since it is not intended to elect fewer than 7 Constitutional Committee members, even after the reduction of `committeeMinSize` to 5.